Hence, local authorities typically took common-sense decisions, without waiting for instructions
from above. In addition, the information flow was deficient; hydrometeorological stations reported to the regional branches of the hydrometeorological service (albeit making information available, on request, to local authorities as well). Some of the forecasts proved to be inaccurate. Selleck BIRB 796 Among the downsides of the forecasting and warning system was the telecommunication support. Classical telecommunication links were disconnected. Even if mobile phones provided more reliable communication, the system turned out to have limitations. Advance warning on the Odra was available for its medium and lower course when the flood developed in its headwaters in the Czech Republic and Poland. The State of Brandenburg in Germany had ten days before the arrival of the floodwater. Yet detailed forecasts were difficult to Nutlin-3a order obtain, for example, because observations at several gauges were interrupted and the flood information office in Wrocław was itself flooded. It
was recognised that the following work needed to be carried out: modernisation of the weather radar network and stream/rain gauges; automation of data transmission; technical upgrading of flood warning centres, including telecommunication facilities (phone, radio, fax, if necessary, capable of operating without
a mains supply); upgrading of the early warning system by enhancing the regional, interregional and international flow of flood-related information; constructing more suitable forecast models. Since the 1997 flood, there has been considerable investment in Poland aimed at improving the flood preparedness systems; this includes strengthening the flood forecasting and warning systems (e.g. the broader use of modern technology, radar, models, GIS). Efforts have been made to upgrade the monitoring systems, and to render stream gauges, communication and data Amylase transmission systems more robust and more reliable than during the 1997 flood. In the last ten years or so, large-scale flood protection programmes have been developed in Poland, such as the ‘Programme for the Odra 2006’ and the ‘Programme of flood protection in the Upper Vistula basin’. However, these programmes have given rise to mixed opinions nationally and internationally, including criticism from the European Commission and NGOs. The strategy was based on assumptions rather than on serious considerations of efficiency. The structural approach of constructing dykes and dams, proposed in the programmes, has been rated by many as insufficient. The programmes assumed that the flood risk would be reduced by the implementation of the (very costly) measures specified in the programmes.